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**NATO AFTER IRAQ:
OUT OF SECTOR, OR OUT OF BUSINESS?**

BY

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NATO AFTER IRAQ:

OUT OF SECTOR, OR OUT OF BUSINESS ?

An individual Study Project

by

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
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ABSTRACT

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The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has survived many Cold war crises over the past forty-one years, only to be faced now with the most crucial test to Alliance solidarity: The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the effect of the war in the Gulf. This paper examines the future of NATO in light of these two cataclysmic events. It is the author's thesis that unless NATO accepts the out-of-area mission for its military forces, it will become a hollow shell and collapse upon itself. The method of analysis is simple and direct: First, demonstrate that there is historical precedent for NATO military forces being employed out-of-sector; second, review the basic NATO Charter to ensure that it does not expressly prohibit NATO forces operating out of the Central Region; third, illustrate that Germany's Basic Law does not prohibit their military forces from being deployed out of the Central Region; and finally, persuade the reader that no European only organization (WEU, EC, or CSCE) could handle this out-of-area mission.

Today I can report to you that the Soviet Union has taken a decision to reduce its armed forces. Within the next two years their numerical strength will be reduced by 500,000 men. The numbers of conventional armaments will also be substantially reduced.

Mikhail S. Gorbachev
Speech at the United Nations
December 8, 1988

The future ain't what it used to be.

Yogi Berra

Introduction

On February 25, 1991 in Budapest, Hungary, the foreign ministers of six Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union accomplished with the stroke of a pen what the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has spent the last forty years trying to achieve: The elimination of aggression, or fear of aggression, posed by the Soviet dominated Warsaw Pact. On that historic day in Hungary, the member "states of the Warsaw Treaty, acting as sovereign states with equal rights, decided that by March 31, 1991, they will dismantle the military organs and structures of the Treaty." [1]

what was inconceivable one year ago is inevitable today. Complete German reunification. Germany remains in NATO. The collapse of Communist governments in all of

Eastern Europe. The initial signing of the Conventional Force in Europe (CFE) Agreement by 22 members of both blocs in Paris last November, with the commitment of "not to resort to force" to resolve disputes. The Warsaw Pact, with its three million troops - most of them Soviet - would no longer be able to use force, or threaten to use force, against any NATO member, or more significantly, against its own member states. Certainly such an event would dominate the world news: The Cold War was over and the west had won.

But wait a moment, why was this on page sixteen of the first section of *The Washington Post*? As momentous and truly historical as this occasion was, it paled in current news significance when compared with the war in the Gulf, the massive counterattack by coalition forces to evict Saddam Hussein's occupation troops from Kuwait that was occurring at precisely the same time. The complete coalition victory, a mere twenty-four hours later, would culminate the most significant forty-eight hour period in European history since the end of the second World War.

Much has already been written about this historical watershed in the affairs of Europe, but these two events frame the fundamental question this paper will attempt to examine: Does NATO have a future into the twenty-first century, and if so, what should it be?[2]

As NATO's former Secretary General, Lord Carrington pointed out. "It's much easier to hold the [NATO] alliance together when they're frightened than when they're not." [3] Even though the immediate threat of a conventional attack led by the Soviet Union against NATO member states seems remote, there currently appears little interest by any of the Alliance members for the quick dissolution of the most successful alliance in history. It is clearly too early for the heads of government of each member nation of NATO to have determined what lies ahead, but the cataclysmic events noted above have inexorably pushed NATO in a new direction: The issue of employment of NATO military forces in out-of-area contingencies.[4]

My thesis is twofold. First, unless NATO accepts this out-of-sector challenge *a priori* instead of *ad hoc*, all attempts to maintain the alliance for any other reason, barring a complete reversal of Soviet conventional force projection capability, will ultimately result in failure. And second, for the foreseeable future, NATO is the only organization that has the military forces, command structure, and capability to respond to these out-of-area threats to Alliance members.

This brief essay will not, indeed cannot, examine all the vectors currently facing the NATO planners as they attempt to peer into the twenty-first century. As always, there is much discussion of converting the Alliance into

something it never was intended to be: A political forum for democratic values for the emerging Eastern European democracies.[5] NATO, although by definition a political alliance of western democratic nations, was created to provide for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security," as stated in the preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty. In spite of the many ancillary benefits enjoyed by its member nations, it remains predominantly and primarily a defensive military alliance, and as such, absent a convincing and grand military strategy, will soon fade into obscurity.[6]

My method of attack will be quite simple and direct: To debunk some existing and emerging myths concerning NATO's forces. First, that there is no historical precedent for NATO military forces being employed out-of-area. Second, that the NATO Treaty specifically prohibits NATO deploying forces out-of-sector. Third, that a united Germany would be constitutionally unable to send any military force under UN or NATO command out of the Central Region. And finally, that there are other organizations, such as the Western European Union (WEU), the European Community (EC), or the Conference on Cooperation and Security (CSCE) that are better suited for this out-of-area military mission. These issues being understood, the essay returns the reader to its fundamental original thesis: Unless NATO accepts vital

out-of-sector military challenges, then it will die a natural death.

But first, a brief primer on each organization mentioned above:

CSCE - Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It is a voluntary organization of thirty-three nations, created in 1975 with the signing of the Helsinki Accords. To date, its primary mission has been to provide a forum for confidence building measures between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and to monitor any Human Rights violations occurring in any of the signatory nations. In the past, members of CSCE would visit training areas and major maneuver exercises of both alliances. With the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, CSCE is now seeking new roles and missions. Its greatest strength, and some would argue, potentially greatest liability is that all member nations have one vote. Both the United States and the Soviet Union are signatory members.

WEU - The western European Union. It was established in 1954 with the aim of furthering European integration and security through increased cooperation among seven (now nine) Western European nations (France, Britain, the Benelux countries, Spain, Italy, Germany and Portugal). It has been largely on the NATO sidelines until the Gulf crisis; many are now envisioning a great military role in the future for

forces from WEU member states. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States is a member.

EC - The European Community. It is primarily a political and economic umbrella under which European nations are attempting to establish a single market and tariff free zone by 1992. The EC has twelve member nations, nine that belong to the WEU plus Greece, Ireland and Denmark. The EC is also potentially viewed as the parent organization under which the WEU military forces would deploy and operate. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States is a member.

NATO: why it has worked so well, so long

As every high school history student knows (or at least should know), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed in April 1949 when President Harry Truman signed the Treaty, stating that this new alliance, "would create a shield against aggression and fear of aggression - a bulwark which will permit us to get on with the real business of achieving a fuller and happier life for all our citizens."

[7] The sixteen member nations have certainly enjoyed the peace and prosperity promised by this alliance for more than forty years. The Warsaw Pact, which was formed as a Soviet dominated Eastern European alliance against NATO, has been defeated, and NATO has emerged the complete victor. The Central Region is no longer threatened by a massive conventional forces attack.

One can argue, and indeed many have, as to the many specific reasons for NATO's success. The North Atlantic Alliance has survived when different security organizations such as SEATO, CENTO, the Baghdad Pact and ANZUS have all become the topic of alliance obituaries. [8] Of course, the question is why.

The most compelling characteristic enjoyed by NATO, but not these other organizations, is the clarity and specificity of the perceived threat posed by the Soviet Union. The observation by former NATO Secretary General Spaak that Joseph Stalin was the 'true father' of the Alliance may not be far from the truth. It is thus apparent that bipolar specific alliances stand a much greater chance of success than multipolar, less specific defense arrangements. In the absence of such a powerful common interest (or fear), "these extra-European alliances either collapsed under the weight of competing particular concerns, or died of neglect." [9]

NATO, thus facing the bipolar competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, has been able to remain focused as the Cold War chilled and warmed over the last forty years. This singular purpose, military in nature, has enabled the Alliance to form not only a common security consensus among its democratic member states, but also key elements of military strategy that will remain relatively unchanged over the foreseeable future. These include the

enduring role of military power for stability, and as a decisive factor in times of tension and crises; the existence of nuclear weapons and their deterrent effect; North American and European stationed reinforcement forces; and finally, the joint defense planning and integrated command and control structure and doctrine. This final point could be the most important. Joint and combined operations are the most difficult of any type of military operation. Such arrangements take years to develop, and decades to perfect. NATO member states, in countless exercises over regions from the tip of northern Norway to the Turkish-Iraqi border, have developed operational techniques and procedures that enable this multinational alliance to be effective. No other coalition in history can boast of such accomplishments over so long a time period.

In spite of, and in some respects, because of this continuity of military focus and purpose since 1949, there are those in and outside the Alliance who would argue that NATO can now shift its focus to non military matters.[10] Such talk is not new. In December 1967, then Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel argued "that the ultimate political purpose was to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe "through military and non-military means." [11] This Harmel concept of defense and dialogue was reaffirmed and expanded upon in both the July 1990 London Declaration of the Heads of State and Governments of NATO

member nations and the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Communique of December 1990.[12] Envisioned in these documents are a decreased military role of NATO; the transformation of CSCE into a more robust organization with enhanced military responsibilities; and finally, new non-military vistas for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Such discussion, I fear, is leading NATO blissfully down the path of many now defunct alliances: A military organization that has lost focus and sees itself as something it has never been. The Alliance's military might, and most importantly, its command and control infrastructure to respond to crises, would be lost just as the member nations would be facing their most difficult challenge, the out-of-area threat to their collective security.

Out-of-Sector Arena

NATO out-of-sector debates have raged, or more appropriately whimpered, since its founding in 1949.[13] Not that these issues have not been important, but with the great Soviet bear staring at you from across the table, one does not worry too much about the crumbs the mice are stealing from the floor. It was not until the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, that NATO, and the rest of the western world sat up and took notice.[14]

From the 1949 Suez Crisis to the 1987 reflagging of Kuwaiti oil tankers, Douglas Stuart and William Tow have chronicled more than thirty of these extra-regional challenges to NATO's solidarity in their fine work, **Limits of an Alliance**. Endemic to all out-of-area disputes were military conflicts to which forces of NATO countries, but not NATO forces, were sent. This is key. All the extra-regional disputes involved the use of force, or the projected use of force. There was no discussion of the concept of out-of-area dialogue of detente.[15]

In addition, Stuart makes the observation that the disputes could be broken down into two distinct chronological periods: The first two decades are characterized by unsuccessful European solicitation of American help; the second twenty years finds the roles reversed.[16] All of this within the rubric of a dominating Soviet military threat, maintaining the cohesiveness of the western alliance, while allowing the extracurricular activities of NATO member states. With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the retrenchment of Soviet conventional military power and the democratization of the former Eastern Bloc, the Soviet glue that has held the alliance together for so long appears to have dissolved. Any projection into the future must keep this in perspective.

NATO's Basic Charter: Is Out-of-Area Force Allowed?

As one pursues the out-of-area issue for NATO, the most persistent theme one encounters is the 'alleged' geographical limitation of NATO military force deployment. Quite clearly, Article 6 of the Basic Treaty spells out a distinct geographical region in which an attack on one member nation shall be considered an attack on all.[17] But is this an exclusionary role? Clearly not. Those who argue most vociferously against the out-of-sector mission for NATO forces do not rule out this possibility from the NATO Charter stand point.[18] Article 3 allows the member nations to develop their "individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack," while Article 4 allows them to consult "whenever the territorial integrity or political independence or security of any of the parties is threatened." [19]

There are no Treaty prohibitions against NATO member nations conducting military actions, under the umbrella of the United Nations, but using the command and control infrastructure of their own organizations, directed at out-of-area threats to its collective security. In fact, Harmel recognized this as his fourth point in his report presented in 1967. It was addressed specifically at the NATO Ministerial meeting in December 1989, and Secretary General Manfred Woerner has discussed repeatedly this option these past two years.[20] Even Stuart and Iow argue that a NATO directorate for out of area issues would be a useful

initiative, although they remain steadfast in their belief that NATO should not transcend its borders.[21]

It appears certain, therefore, that the founding fathers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization established not one, but two conditions within which member states could employ military force. One limited by geography based on an attack upon a member nation, and another, without borders, to protect alliance members when their security is threatened.[22] In addition, Article 3 of the Basic Treaty speaks against any limitation of a NATO operational area when it provides that "the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack." [23]

Assuming there to be no NATO Treaty limiting prohibition for out-of-sector military force projection, what about the individual member states' military deployment policies? Immediately, the controversy surrounding Germany's ability to send forces out of the Central Region comes into question. Even if NATO did adopt an out-of-area policy, would this simply be a moot initiative because of the inability of reunified Germany, NATO's richest European partner with the largest continental-based armed forces, to deploy its military out of the region?

Germany and the Out-of-Area Controversy

Among all Alliance partners, the role of the recently reunited Germany seems to be pivotal. In no NATO country does the discussion of sending forces outside of the Central European region stir such passions. Social Democratic Party (SPD) opposition leader, Hans-Jochen Vogel has repeatedly stressed that any deployment of German military forces outside of Central Europe would definitely require a change in Germany's Basic Law, its Constitution.[24] He is not alone in opposition. Even Otto Graf Lambsdorff, the leader of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and ruling coalition partner with Helmut Kohl's Christian Democrats, as recently as January 21, 1991, has made very similar arguments.[25]

Is this necessarily so? In reviewing the former Federal Republic of Germany's (FRG) contribution to NATO over the last thirty-six years, it is clear that the German Armed Forces, the 'Bundeswehr', were viewed, quite rightly, as a purely defensive contribution to the larger body of NATO, whose primary mission was to protect the FRG along with the other member nations. There has been no controversy concerning the Basic Law limiting this clearly defined NATO military mission.

In order to avoid the politically unpalpable issue of committing Bundeswehr forces outside of NATO, an apparent ban in the German Constitution has been invented so as not

to permit the deployment of forces outside the NATO arena. Articles 87a and 24 of the Basic Law only prescribe that Germany should deploy forces for Defense, which bars any wars of aggression.[26] This is the first great misunderstanding. The second is that the Basic Law does not ban military defensive action in a NATO context. As argued above, the North Atlantic Treaty does define a certain area in which an attack on one of the members is considered an attack on all, and requires the assistance of all countries to one another. This area could be defined as NATO's guarantee area. However, no article forbids its members from warding off threats outside the guarantee area.[27] These arguments of a German 'constitutional ban', although extremely emotionally charged, seem little more than a reflection of strong political reticence.

Chancellor Kohl, perhaps desiring to clarify and demonstrate newly forming German resolve on this issue, has already stated that he will introduce a change to the German Constitution that will make the preceding arguments moot, in fact, will allow German military forces to deploy out-of-area.[28] In his eagerness to resolve this constitutional crisis cited by the opposition and the FDP, Kohl could be creating the conditions to cause a true constitutional dilemma.

Changing the Basic Law of Germany has been a relatively routine occurrence since its ratification in 1949. In fact,

there have been thirty-five changes, not including the massive adaptation that occurred concurrent with German reunification.[29] Even though change is relatively frequent and routine, any proposed modification of the Basic Law requires a two-thirds majority of the 'Bundestag', the German parliament.[30] Therein lies the rub. In order to garnish such a large majority of support, the SPD opposition, with the help of the FDP, will likely try to include a stipulation linking the use of German forces out-of-sector with certain conditions, such a request by the United Nations and under UN command, the WEU or even the CSCE.[31] What was well intentioned could, in reality, become an ill advised obstacle. Instead of deploying forces with NATO for an out-of-area mission that is clearly defensive in nature and protects German interests, the disposal of troops, if subject to the vote of CSCE, could be dependent on the desires of Romania, Malta or whatever part of Yugoslavia is left with its vote.

Reexamining the Threat to NATO

In the first blush of analysis after the stunning American-led coalition victory over Saddam Hussein, the concept of what is a threat to NATO security interests is clearly to be redefined. In August 1990, had Saddam Hussein pursued his aggression into Saudi Arabia and occupied its key oil fields, Iraq would have been physically holding more

than forty percent of the world's known oil reserves. The specter of a ruthless dictator being able to manipulate access to oil, and by default, economic policy of the Western developed nations, caused an immediate reevaluation of how a threat in the 'New World Order' as envisioned by President Bush would be defined. Quite remarkably, most member nations of NATO, along with thirteen other nations, determined it was in their national interest to send forces to join the anti-Iraq coalition.[32] NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner told a recent meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly in London that "the NATO Treaty does not limit the scope of our security planning or coordination; nor does it exclude all joint action." [33] In Woerner's view, NATO's security is not only defined in terms of overt aggression, but also should include factors and forces, both military and economic, well outside the geographically defined Central Region.

The role of CSCE, WEU and EC

As the crisis in the Gulf developed, so did the predominantly European discussion on forging new importance, and more succinctly, new roles and responsibilities for CSCE, WEU and the EC. The Gulf War provided the catalyst to stimulate a great debate over the role that any of these organizations would have in future defense and security issues. They are all scrambling to cut out an appropriate

piece of the pie. Although somewhat premature, there are some clear indications in what direction the wind will blow.

Consensus appears to be growing that the WEU could be the military arm of out-of-sector action in future crisis. Serious discussion, from academics and politicians alike, seems to favor the long dormant WEU as the conventional

Rapid Deployment Force'. [34] Almost all cite the lack of geographical boundaries in the basic charter of the WEU that allows the military to respond to threats "in whatever area this threat should arise" as well as to threats to economic security. [35] The current Secretary General of this European alliance, Dr. William van Eekelen, stated "the WEU is tailor made for the current [Gulf] crisis. We have not been viewed as an arm of the United States." [36]

In WEU's current condition, the term 'tailor made' can only be used if one is referring to a handmade patchwork quilt. Before the enthusiasm of the resurrection of this long moribund alliance sweeps NATO aside for the European Pillar, the WEU's organizational structure and recent performance in the Gulf must be examined.

WEU's Organizational Architecture - It would be appropriate here to provide the obligatory figure showing the integrated and redundant lines of command and control for this European security organization. Unfortunately, there are none - no slides because such a structure does not

exist. The nine members of the WEU meet regularly only twice a year. Even though a Parliamentary Assembly exists, there are no standing military committees, no permanent military staffs or representatives, and no formal or direct interface with NATO's military command and control or its crisis action staff. Not surprisingly, it took the WEU nearly **three weeks** to meet and then decide to send a joint naval mission to the Gulf, "partly because many of the ministers were either on vacation or had to attend to duties at the national level." [37]

It should also come as no surprise that no military forces are dedicated solely for employment by the WEU. Although Dr. van Eekelen strongly favors an integrated command and control structure for the WEU, there is considerable controversy among the member nations. British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd objects to any separate WEU command infrastructure, fearing that it would exclude the United States, and as such, could further fuel isolationist sentiment in Washington. [38]

The French, not wanting to be upstaged by the British, paradoxically support the same position, but for much different reasons. Former French Defense Minister Jean-Pierre Chevenement stated that a planned multinational force using elements of NATO for its command and control (which would be essential, since the WEU has none of its own) would be strongly opposed by his nation because it

could be interpreted as an 'covert return' by France to NATO's integrated military command structure, something the French quit in 1966.[39] How the current Defense Minister, let alone President Mitterand stands on this issue, is not yet clear.

And finally, one must now only look at the map of Europe to see that, with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the yet to be ratified CFE agreement, Central Europe would seem to be the area least likely for armed conflict well into the next century. With all the troubles the Soviets are having in their outlying Republics, especially the three Baltic states, and with the rise of fundamentalism and nationalistic fervor on the Southern flank, a prudent WEU military planner (if he existed) would certainly be focusing his out-of-region contingencies on those areas. But the European countries to whom these flash points could potentially be most threatening - Denmark, Greece, Turkey, and Norway - are not members of the WEU.[40]

To bring more order to the WEU, there is currently a plan afoot that would eventually place the WEU under the direction of the EC.[41] This would only exacerbate the already convoluted and confusing command and control organization which would be thrust upon the WEU. Structurally, the EC could not directly discuss with NATO any deployments of European military forces to the Gulf,

because at present, the WEU and EC have no secure communication link between their two headquarters. [42]

On a more fundamental level, the ability of the EC to play a major role in any such fast-moving international events as the Gulf crisis has been made nearly impossible by the incredibly inane complexity of its own institutions. Under the Treaty of Rome, the EC's main charter, military matters cannot even be discussed. More recent attempts to bring a narrower range of military and security matters under the authority of the EC itself, as were made during the 1986 revision of the Treaty of Rome, have been consistently and vociferously blocked by the neutral Irish.[43]

A final word on organizational architecture must be reserved for the CSCE. The June 1990 London Declaration on a transformed North Atlantic Alliance adopted six specific proposals to transform the CSCE into a forum for more intense political dialogue.[44] While all six proposals will certainly reinforce the confidence building nature of the organization, none of them would be an appropriate infrastructure for command and control of military forces. The CSCE currently does not even enjoy regularly scheduled meetings, and it is trying to establish a new headquarters in Prague.[45] Finally, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe depends on unanimity of opinion from

its 33 member states to reach a consensus. In this current form, it is inconceivable that there could be such agreement among so many diverse governments to send a military force into any region that would most likely be in a nation that is signatory to CSCE.

WEU's Performance in the War in the Gulf

In the remarkable display of brilliant operational art, superb soldiers and officers, complex high-tech weapons systems and flawless execution, the military components from the member states of the Western European Union performed exceptionally well. Their air, land and sea forces were all integrated into General Schwarzkopf's overall military strategy and campaign plan. These combat forces played a key, albeit fairly minor, role in what former Air Force Chief of Staff Michael Dugan has ordained as history's first example of hyperwar; the term blitzkrieg is no longer accurate. [46]

But just as certain as the seeds of Eisenhower's victory in Europe in World War II were sown in the fields of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas some ten years prior to that conflict, the seeds of this splendid military victory in the Gulf were sown in NATO and numerous REFORGER exercises. Only forty years of working together as Alliance members, with an integrated command and logistics infrastructure, could have:

- Moved the largest corps in the U.S. Army (with more than 75,000 soldiers, 36,000 vehicles and 600 aircraft) from bases in Germany to Saudi Arabia in less than ninety days.
- Insured that standard support from fuel (JP-8), to communication interfaces and ammunition were available to all deployed forces.
- Allowed all NATO commanders the comfort of knowing that the Air Land Battle Doctrine, practiced numerous occasions during previous command post and maneuver exercises, would be the operational art used to defeat massive the Iraqi army.
- Reinforced the confidence among all NATO participating members concerning the ability and capability of their coalition partners, based on years of practiced interoperability.

Thus, even though member nations of the WEU played a vital role in the military action against Saddam Hussein's Iraq, their overall success was only possible because of NATO's forty-plus years of working together in exercises and crises alike. Without the United States contribution to NATO, which provided 80% of the logistic support, 75% of the command and control and 100% of the strategic and operational intelligence, there could have been no

deployment of forces from WEU nations, much less any tactical contribution.

Conclusion

One must never forget the purpose of a defensive military alliance:

- To deter war
- Should deterrence fail, prosecute the campaign as rapidly as possible to bring the conflict to a favorable resolution, based on the parameters established by the political leadership

It is in this light that this brief essay focused upon the role of NATO in a post-Gulf environment, and ancillary thereto, the role of any European based institution, such as WEU, EC or CSCE to project forces out-of-area for defense of the Alliances' vital interests. The intention was to debunk some persistent misconceptions of Treaty limiting geographical restraints on NATO forces, as well as constitutional restriction on the use of German military forces in an out-of-sector role. Although there is, and will remain for the foreseeable future, a general hesitancy of NATO member states' political will to accept this interpretation, the argument of statutory limitation appears largely based on existing protocol, rather than actual prohibition.

This short analysis also tried to illustrate that the WEU, the rising star for any NATO out-of-region contingency, is virtually incapable of projecting forces anywhere without massive support from United States logistic, communication and intelligence infrastructure. When combined with the complete lack of any internal military staffing and crisis response capability, the currency of a WEU deterrent force is greatly devalued.

This leads me to the final, and most important, point: Unless NATO accepts this challenge, then it will become what all other western alliances with a lack of a central focus have evolved into - a living corpse. Even though the freedom and security of Washington's European Alliance partners will remain a vital U.S. interest as far into the future as anyone will predict, it is extremely naive for our European partners to assume that with America reducing its combat forces forward deployed in Europe to one corps, the logistic, communication and command infrastructure existing today in NATO would remain in place forever. If the WEU, or any other exclusive European organization lays sole proprietary claim to the out-of-sector mission, then NATO would be relegated to a supporting role. Would any American, especially those in Congress looking for a 'peace dividend', endorse such a role? I think not; this is my greatest fear. By pursuing so rapidly such a European option for out-of-area threats, threats that most certainly

will pose the greatest conventional danger to NATO well into the twenty-first century, the very Alliance that has the capability to project the appropriate military forces could be discarded for lack of a mission. And without NATO, its forty-plus years of responding to crises, interoperability, and deploying and redeploying millions of soldiers and tons of equipment, the WEU would be unable to deploy a credible military force into Luxembourg.

This brief essay does not rule out a mission for the WEU under the NATO umbrella, but it cannot be so critical as responding to out-of-sector threats. The WEU and other European organizations could provide military forces to the United Nations for peacekeeping or other purposes. They could be used in disaster relief, or deploy into a nation requesting specific military assistance. Assuming final ratification of the CFE Treaty, they could be quite useful in providing skilled military professionals to verify compliance. Finally, within the rubric of NATO, they could be the forum to reinforce the European pillar of defense e.g., by conducting joint operations that would enhance interoperability as NATO military structure evolves toward multinational corps.

History is replete with examples of grand strategic opportunities missed, ignored or simply set aside. We are currently at such a juncture. Instead of clinging to a military strategy of the past, NATO must take the lead and

boldly project into the future. There is room for the WEU in NATO, but not exclusive of it. Even though all who today are advocating an out-of-sector contingency force do so within the context of NATO, divorce this mission from the primary focus of Atlantic Alliance, and only a hollow shell will remain, certain to collapse upon itself.

ENDNOTES

1. See, **The Washington Post**, February 26, 1991.
2. Much has been written on the future of NATO. Perhaps the best brief analysis is contained in an article by Peter Corterier, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Assembly, the interparliamentary organization of NATO nations, entitled, "Quo Vadis NATO?", **Survival**, Volume 32 (2), (March-April 1990), pp. 141-156.
3. See an interview given by then NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington in **USA Today**, March 2, 1988.
4. In view of the recent surge of interest in out-of-area issues, three books are worth reviewing for background information: Jed C. Snyder, **Defending the Fringe**, Boulder: Westview Press, 1987; Elizabeth D. Sherwood, **Allies in Crisis**, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990; Douglas T. Stuart and William Tow, **The Limits of Alliance: NATO Out-Of-Area Problems Since 1949**, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990.
5. See, for background, Jochim Brockpaehler, "The Harmel Philosophy: NATO's Creative Strategy for Peace," **NATO Review**, No. 6, (December 1990), pp. 17-21.
6. See Doug Brandow and Ted Carpenter, "Preserving an Obsolete NATO", **CATO Policy Review**, Vol. XII, No. 5,

(September-October 1990), pp. 9-14.

7. For an excellent overview of NATO's beginnings, see Don Cook, *Forging the Alliance: NATO 1949-1950*, New York: Arbor House, 1989.
8. See Douglas I. Stuart's most recent writing on the out-of-area problem, a monograph entitled, "Can NATO Transcend Its Borders", Carlisle: The Strategic Studies Institute, February 21, 1991.
9. *Limits of an Alliance*, p. 313.
10. See an interview that NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner gave to *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, (Munich), December 3, 1990, p. 2, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)-WEU-90-233*, December 4, 1990, pp. 5-6.
11. The best original perspective is contained in the Harmel Report, as discussed by Jochim Brockpaehler, *NATO Review*, (December 1990), p. 19.
12. See Henning Wegeners analysis of the London Declaration "The Transformed Alliance", *NATO Review*, Vol. 38, No. 4, (August 1990), pp. 1-9, 32-35.
13. For a complete chronology of out-of-area conflicts since NATO's creation, see *Limits of an Alliance*, pp. 12-19.

14. See, for example, Marco Bontinck, "NAIO's Out-Of-Area Problem", **Adelphi Papers**, No. 211, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies), 1986.
15. See Douglas I. Stuart and William Tow, pp. 313-323.
16. See, for background, Catherine Kelleher and Gale Maddox, eds., **Evolving European Defense Policies**, Lexington: Heath, 1987, specifically, "The Out-Of-Area Issue: Is NATO an Island?", pp. 59-77.
17. See John R. Reed, Jr., **Germany and NATO**, Washington: National Defense University Press, 1987. p. 231.
18. See, for example, Thomas-Durell Young, "Solving the Western Alliance's Out-of-Area Conundrum", Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, Draft Manuscript, January, 1991.
19. John R. Reed, Jr., p. 230.
20. There are many examples of Secretary General Manfred Woerner speaking out on this issue, some of the more recent are, **The Guardian**, (London), November 30, 1990, in FBIS-WEU-90-233, December 4, 1990, p. 2; **Suddeutsche Zeitung**, (Munich), December 3, 1990 in FBIS-WEU-90-233, December 4, 1990, p. 5; **Die Welt**, (Hamburg), January 4, 1991, p. 4, in FBIS-WEU-91-004, January 7, 1991, pp. 2-4.

21. **Limits of an Alliance**, pp. 320-321.
22. **Ibid.**, pp. 3-26.
23. John R. Reed, Jr., p. 231.
24. See, interview with Hans-Jochen Vogel, **ZDF**, (Hamburg) January 22, 1991, **FBIS-WEU-91-015**, January 23, 1991, p. 15.
25. See, Otto Graf Lambsdorff, **DPA**, (Hamburg), January 21, 1991, in **FBIS-WEU-91-014**, January 22, 1991, p. 21.
26. For an expert legal interpretation of this contentious issue, see (in German only) Norbert K. Reidel, "Verfassung Begrenz und des NATO-Operationsgebiets", in **Zeitschrift fuer Wehrrecht**, Munich: J. Schweitzer Verlag, 1989, pp. 187-189.
27. See, Guenther Gillessen, **Frankfurter Allgemeine**, (Frankfurt), January 11, 1991, in **FBIS-WEU-91-008**, January 11, 1991, pp. 11-12, and television interview with federal government spokesman Dieter Vogel, **ADN**, (Berlin), January 2, 1991, in **FBIS-WEU-91-002**, January 3, 1991, p. 13.
28. See, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, "Informationsfunk Der Bundesregierung", (in German only), February 4, 1991, and Hans Dietrich Genscher, **Welt im Sonntag**,

- (Berlin), in FBIS-WEU-91-023, February 4, 1991, p. 23.
29. See, 'Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands', (in German only) Bonn: Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Nr. 104/S. 877, September 6, 1990.
30. See, *Der Spiegel*, (Hamburg), October 15, 1990, pp. 26-30, in FBIS-WEU-90-218, November 9, 1990, pp. 1-2.
31. See, interview with the German Defense Minister Stoltzberg, *The Wall Street Journal*, September 27, 1990.
32. See, for background, *The Washington Post*, February 19, 1991.
33. For example, Manfred Woerner's comments, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, December 3, 1990, p. 6., FBIS-WEU-90-233, December 4, 1990, p. 5.
34. See, for background, *Volksstimme*, (Vienna), November 28, 1990, p. 1, in FBIS-WEU-90-229, November 28, 1990, p. 29, and the 'Genscher-Dumas-Initiative', released February 5, 1991.
35. See article by Valero Sanone, "European Security Strengthened by Gulf Events", IL-SORE-24 ORE, (Milan) August 24, 1990, p. 4, in FBIS-WEU-90-189, September 29, 1990, p. 37.

36. For background see, Dr. William van Eekelen's statement on European security, "The Future of European Security and Defence Cooperation", November 22, 1990, and an interview in *Die Welt*, (Hamburg), December 4, 1990, p. 14, in FBIS-WEU-90-237, December 10, 1990, p. 10.
37. See, *The Wall Street Journal*, September 4, 1990.
38. For an insight into the British position, see interview with Douglas Hurd, AFP, (Paris), April 23, 1990, in FBIS-WEU-90-079, April 24, 1990, p. 1.
39. Ibid.
40. See, Manfred Woerner, *Liberation*, (Paris), February 26, 1991, pp. 17-18, in FBIS-WEU-91-042, March 4, 1991, pp. 2-3.
41. See, *The New York Times*, December 26, 1990.
42. For background, see comments by former French Defense Minister Dumas in *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, (Frankfurt) December 5, 1990, in FBIS-WEU-91-006, January 9, 1991, p. 4.
43. See, *The Wall Street Journal*, September 4, 1990.
44. Note that even though this concept was not new, it is expressly referred to in the London Declaration, see "The Transformed Alliance", *NATO Review*, Vol. 38,

No. 4, (August 1990), pp. 32-35.

45. See, "United Forum for Military Operations", in
Hufuudstadsbladet, (Oslo), November 3, 1990, p. 3.

in FBIS-WEU-90-217, November 8, 1990, p. 1.

46. Regarding the issue of lessons learned from the just
completed Gulf War, this is the first definitive
article by an acknowledged expert in military affairs,
GEN Michael Dugan, U.S. News and World Report, Vol.
110, No. 10., March 18, 1991, p. 36.